The law applicable to international commercial contracts : a comparative study of the Rome I Regulation and Indian private international law by Harneker, Zaida
COPYRIGHT AND CITATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS THESIS/ DISSERTATION 
o Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if
changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that
suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
o NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
o ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your
contributions under the same license as the original.
How to cite this thesis 
Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s 
Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: 
http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017).    
1 
 
 
 
 
Name and Surname:         Zaida Harneker 
 
Student Number:         201509682 
 
Email Address:          zaidaharneker0@gmail.com 
 
LLM:           Masters in Commercial Law 
 
Mini-Dissertation Topic:                The law applicable to international  
                                                         commercial contracts: a comparative study  
        of the Rome I Regulation and Indian private      
        international law 
 
Supervisor:                 Professor J L Neels 
 
Word Count:          9 742 words 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..    3 
2. India ………………………..…………………………………………………………………………………….……...   5 
2.1 Background …………………………………………………………………………………..………………..   5 
2.2 The law applicable in international commercial contracts …………………..………….   6 
2.3 The role of the Hague Principles in respect of choice of law in international 
commercial contracts in Indian private international law ………………………..………  10 
3. The European Union: The Rome I Regulation ………………………………………………………..  11 
3.1 Background ………………………………………………………………………………….………………..   11 
3.2 The law applicable in international commercial contracts ………………………………  12 
3.3 The development of choice of law in international commercial contracts 
in the United Kingdom’s private international law ………………………………………….   20 
4. Comparison ……………………………………………………………….………………………………………….  21 
5. Conclusion ………………………………………………….……………………………..…………………………  26 
6. Case Index and Bibliography …..……………………………………………………………….……………  27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This mini-dissertation is a comparative study on the law applicable to international 
commercial contracts between the Rome I Regulation1 and Indian private international law.2 
The governing / applicable law is that legal system or set of rules that governs the contract.3 
Note: in civil law jurisdictions the governing law of a contract is referred to as ‘the applicable 
law’; and in common law jurisdictions the governing law of a contract is referred to as ‘the 
proper law of a contract’. 
 
In the case of Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait 1983 AC 50 (HL), Lord Diplock 
remarked that contracts would not have legal effect and would accordingly only amount to a 
piece of paper if it were not concluded with reference to a particular system of private law. 
The rationale for this is that a particular system of law is required as it is what would define 
the parties’ obligations under the contract; and furthermore, would also provide the relevant 
remedies that are available should there be a failure to perform in terms of the relevant 
contract.4 
 
Every country / state / jurisdiction has its own set of rules or methodology in terms of which 
the applicable law is determined. This methodology or set of rules is also known as ‘conflict 
of law’ rules.5 In some countries / states / jurisdictions, the set of rules is codified in a statute, 
for example, the conflict of law rules relating to the European Union (EU) is contained in the 
Rome I Regulation.6 In other countries / states / jurisdictions, the set of rules can be 
ascertained from academic sources or compilations, for example, the Restatement (Second)  
 
                                                          
1 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation). 
2 There is currently no statute on Indian private international law. Bouwers “The Law Applicable to an 
International Contract of Sale in the Absence of a Choice of Law – A Comparative Study of Brazilian, Russian, 
Indian, Chinese and South African Private International Law” (2013 mini-dissertation UJ) 14 and Khanderia 
“Indian private international law vis-à-vis party autonomy in the choice of law” 2018 Oxford University of 
Commonwealth Law Journal and https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1436262. Refer to section 2 of this 
mini-dissertation for further details on Indian private international law in respect of choice of law. 
3 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee Global Sales and Contract Law (2012) 51. 
4 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 3) 52. 
5 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 3) 52. 
6 Refer to s 3 of this mini-dissertation for a discussion on the conflict of law rules under the Rome I Regulation. 
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of Contracts;7 or the set of rules can be ascertained from case law, for example, in Indian 
private international law.8 Most countries / states / jurisdictions afford the parties the right 
to choose the applicable law to the contract in the first instance. This is known as the principle 
of party autonomy; party autonomy is now an established principle in most jurisdictions.9 
However, the private international law rules vary in respect of how far this right stretches. 
For example, the rules of private international law of a jurisdiction could dictate that the 
principle of party autonomy is unlimited. In such an instance the parties can choose a foreign 
law to govern their contract, even where a connection to such foreign law is absent. Article 
3(1) of the Rome I Regulation provides the parties with the freedom to choose a law to govern 
their contract; such freedom is not restricted to a legal system that is connected to the 
contract or the parties. Yet, in other jurisdictions where the principle of party autonomy is 
applicable, the freedom of choice could be restricted to a choice of law that is connected to 
the relevant contractual obligation.10 In the event that the parties do not exercise their right 
to choose the governing law of the contract, or in the event that this right is not afforded to 
the parties in the first place, then the other relevant conflict rules must be investigated to 
determine the applicable law.11 
 
Section 2 of this mini-dissertation will address the history of colonisation in India by the British 
and explain how it is that India still applies the common law system, despite its independence 
since 1947. The conflict of law rules in India, which can be found in case law, will be 
investigated. The role that the Hague Principles12 can play in respect of choice of law in an 
international commercial contract in relation to India will also be discussed. Section 3 will 
investigate the conflict of law rules relevant to the EU, which is codified in terms of the Rome 
I Regulation. The history of the Rome I Regulation will be addressed briefly. The development  
 
                                                          
7 The purpose of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is to advise lawyers and judges of the general principles 
of contract common law. It is a legal treatise which emanates from the second series of the ‘Restatement of the 
Law’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restatement_(Second)_of_Contracts (04-11-2019). 
8 Refer to s 2 of this mini-dissertation for a discussion on the conflict of law rules in Indian private international 
law. 
9 Khanderia (n 2) 2. 
10 Khanderia (n 2) 2. 
11 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 3) 52. 
12The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (2015) 
https://docentes.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/MHB_MA_31647.pdf. (02-12-2019). 
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of choice of law in international commercial contracts in the UK’s private international law 
will be briefly mentioned as it is (historically) linked to the conflict of law rules in India.  Section 
4 will compare some of the conflict of law rules between the Rome I Regulation, Indian private 
international law and the Hague Principles. Section 5 will provide very brief concluding 
remarks in relation to the findings contained in the comparison section. 
 
2. India 
2.1 Background 
India was colonised by the British until 1947. The British imposed their common law legal 
system in India during the period of colonisation. India does not have a statute on choice of 
law in relation to international commercial contracts;13 and the Indian courts sometimes still 
make use of developments in the English common law system even though they are no longer 
bound by same.14 The common law system can be described as a body of law or set of legal 
rules that originate from court decisions.15 In terms of the common law doctrine, the courts 
are obliged to follow the previous rules and principles set out by higher court’s in similar 
matters; this is known as the principle of stare decisis (that is ‘to stand by things decided’). 
Since India does not have a statute on conflict of law issues for international commercial 
contracts, the old English cases are still cited by the courts in India (and are of persuasive 
value), in addition to Indian cases also being cited as authority. Thus, both English and Indian 
cases will also be discussed in the context of India.16 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Agrawal and Singh Private International Law in India (2010) 93. 
14 Neels, “The role of the Hague Principles on choice of law in international commercial contracts in Indian and 
South African private international law” 2017  Uniform Law Review 443 444 and Agrawal and Singh (n 13). 
15 Black’s Law Dictionary https://thelawdictionary.org/common-law/ (04-11-2019). 
16 Note: the UK is now a signatory to the Rome I Regulation and as such, is subject to the rules and principles 
contained in the Rome I Regulation. Thus, the primary source for conflicts of law rules in the UK is currently the 
Rome I Regulation.  
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2.2 The law applicable in international commercial contracts 
Choice of law 
Both an express and implied choice of law is permitted.17 A neutral system of law can be 
chosen by the parties to govern the contract; furthermore, the parties can choose a system 
of law that is not connected to the parties.18 The 1939 English case of Vita Food Products v 
Unus Shipping Company19 was the leading authority on the common law approach to party 
autonomy in relation to choice of law. In casu, the Privy Council held that where the parties 
expressly state their intention regarding the applicable law to the contract, there is no valid 
reason for qualifications in this regard, provided that the intention expressed by the parties 
is both legal and bona fide; the choice must also not be against public policy.20 The Privy 
Council did not elaborate on the meaning of the words ‘bona fide and legal’. Furthermore, in 
the Swedish East Asia Company Ltd case in 1962, the (Indian) high court cited and agreed with 
the view expressed in Halsbury’s “Laws of England” (3rd edition, volume 7) that where the 
parties to a contract have expressly stated that the relevant contract is to be governed by a 
specific law, then such law will indeed be the proper law of the contract, even if the selected 
law has no real connection to the contract.21 Again, it must be noted that the proviso to this 
rule is that the selection of the relevant law is bona fide, legal and is not against public policy.22 
Khanderia reiterates this point in her article, “Indian private international law vis-à-vis party 
autonomy in the choice of law”.23 The approach in terms whereof parties are allowed to 
choose any system of law irrespective of whether or not such choice of law has a connection 
with the contract is known as the subjective interpretation of party autonomy.24  
 
                                                          
17 Agrawal and Singh (n 13) and Basedow, Farrari, de Miguel Asensio and Ruhl Encyclopedia of Private 
International Law (1st ed) 2159. 
18 Agrawal and Singh (n 13), Basedow, Farrari, de Miguel Asensio and Ruhl (n 17), Vita Food Products v Unus 
Shipping Company (n 20), Swedish East Asia Company Ltd v BR Herman and Mohatta (India) PVT Ltd, Indian 
Kanoon http://indiankanoon.org/doc/882120/ (n 21) and Khanderia (n 2) 8-9. 
19 (1939) 1 All ER 513. 
20 Agrawal and Singh (n 13) and Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping Company (n 19) 521. 
21 Swedish East Asia Company Ltd v BR Herman and Mohatta (India) PVT Ltd AIR 1962 Cal 601 and Indian Kanoon 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/882120/ 6 par 2 (15-11-2019). 
22 Indian Kanoon (n 21). 
23 Khanderia (n 2) 9. 
24 Khanderia (n 2) 2. 
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In terms of the objective interpretation of the principle of party autonomy, parties to a 
contract may choose the proper law of a contract, however, such choice is restricted to a 
system of law that is connected to the contract.25  
 
        In the 1955 case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd v Harnam Singh and Others,26 the 
Supreme Court of India agreed that the parties had the right to choose the proper law of the 
contract, but did not favour the subjective interpretation of the principle of party autonomy. 
In casu, it was stated that the subjective interpretation had the potential of producing 
strangely unrealistic results.27 
 As stated above, the High Court in Calcutta, India, in the Swedish East India case of 1962, said 
that where the parties to a contract have expressly stated that the relevant contract is to be 
governed by a specific law, then such law will indeed be the proper law of the the contract, 
even if the selected law has no real connection to the contract.28 In terms of the doctrine of 
stare decisis, lower courts are obliged to follow the decisions and principles set out in the 
same/ similar matters decided upon by higher courts. However, it must be noted that the 
High Court in the Swedish East India case did not follow the principle set out in the Delhi Cloth 
and General Mills Co. case by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 1955 regarding the 
interpretation of the principle of party autonomy.  
 In the 1990 case of British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries 
& Others,29 the Supreme Court of India once again followed the objective interpretation in 
respect of the principle of party autonomy. In casu, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the parties had the right to choose the proper law of the contract and again noted that the 
choice must be bona fide and legal, and also that it may not be against public policy.30 
Furthermore, the court stipulated that the parties did not have the right to choose a wholly  
 
                                                          
25 Khanderia (n 2) 7. 
26 AIR 1955 SC 590 and Indian Kanoon – http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1719283/ (04-11-2019). 
27 Indian Kanoon (n 26) 12 and Khanderia (n 2) 7. 
28 Indian Kanoon (n 21). 
29 1990 SCR (1) 884, 1990 SCC (3) 481 and Indian Kanoon – http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1933943/ (14-11-2019). 
30 Indian Kanoon (n 29) 13. 
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 unconnected law, and that the courts had a residual power to strike down the choice of law 
selected by the parties where such choice of law was totally unconnected to the contract.31 
The 1993 case of National Thermal Power Corporation v Singer Co. and Others,32 clarified the 
position in respect of the proper law of the contract; and is currently the leading authority on 
the issue.33 National Thermal Power, an Indian company, concluded two contracts with Singer 
Company, that is, a foreign company. The parties chose Indian law to govern the contract and 
also made provision for the Delhi courts to have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of disputes 
arising out of the contracts. Furthermore, there was a term that made provision for 
arbitration. The arbitrators had the right to choose the place of arbitration in terms of the 
contract. In casu, the Supreme Court of India cited Dicey’s Rule 180 and sub-rules (1), (2) and 
(3)34 thereof as authority on the topic of choice of law. Same will be discussed below as per 
the Court’s judgment. In terms of Rule 180, the ‘proper law of the contract’ can be defined as 
the system of law that the parties intended their contract to be governed by. If no such 
intention is present (that is, if both express and tacit choice are absent), then the ‘proper law 
of the contract’ will be that system of law that the relevant transaction has its ‘closest and 
most real connection’ with.35 Sub-rule (1) dictates that when the parties express their 
intention in respect of the choice of law in words, then such expression will determine the 
proper law of the contract. As stated above in the Vita Food Products case, when the choice 
of law is expressed in words in the contract, there should be no qualifications in this regard, 
provided that the choice is bona fide, legal and does not flout public policy. Sub-rule (2): 
where the parties have not expressed their intention regarding the choice of law in words, 
then their inferred intention must be sought by the court. That is, the court must draw an 
inference from the terms and nature of the relevant contract, and also from the general 
circumstances of the case. It is this inferred intention that will determine the proper law of 
the contract. Sub-rule (3) dictates that when there is no intention expressed in words, nor an 
intention that could have been inferred by the court from the circumstances of the case, then 
                                                          
31 Indian Kanoon (n 29) 13. 
32 1993 AIR 998, 1992 SCR (3) 106 and Indian Kanoon - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/633347/ (14-11-2019). 
33 Khanderia (n 2) 9. 
34 Collins (ed), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws 1987 1161-1162 (as cited by the court in casu). 
35 Collins (n 34) and Indian Kanoon - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/633347/  (n 32) 9. 
9 
 
 
the relevant contract must be governed by that system of law with which the transaction in 
question has its ‘closest and most real connection’ with.36 In casu, the Supreme Court 
summarised the position as follows: “Proper law is thus the law which the parties have 
expressly or impliedly chosen, or which is imputed to them by reason of its closest and most 
intimate connection with the contract.”37 
 
Proper law of the contract in the absence of choice 
Where the parties have not chosen the applicable law to their contract, the legal system 
which has the ‘most real and substantial connection’ to the contract will apply.38 This same 
position was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the National Thermal Power case as stated 
above. In casu, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express or tacit choice of law, 
then the relevant contract must be governed by that system of law that the transaction in 
question has its ‘closest and most real connection’ with.39 In order to determine which legal 
system has the most real and substantial connection with the contract, various factors must 
be considered. Among these factors to consider are the following: the place of conclusion of 
the contract, the place of performance of the contract, the place of the forum / court that 
was chosen by the parties and the place chosen for arbitration.40 In the Delhi Cloth and 
General Mills Co. case the Supreme Court stated that the proper law of the contract, in the 
absence of a choice of law, is the law of the country in which the relevant contract is ‘located’. 
This is determined by grouping elements (or connecting factors) of the contract together in 
terms of the formation of the contract, as well as the relevant terms of the contract. One must 
ascertain which country the contract is substantially closely connected with by determining 
which country contains most of the elements.41 In casu, the Supreme Court held as follows: 
“On these facts we hold that the elements of this contract, that is to say the contract out of  
 
                                                          
36 Indian Kanoon - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/633347/ (n 32) 9-11. 
37 Indian Kanoon - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/633347/ (n 32) 11. 
38 Basedow, Farrari, de Miguel Asensio and Ruhl (n 17) and Agrawal and Singh (n 13) 94. 
39 Indian Kanoon - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/633347/ (n 32) 9-11. 
40 Basedow, Farrari, de Miguel Asensio and Ruhl (n 17) and Agrawal and Singh (n 13) 95. 
41 Indian Kanoon (n 26) 10 and Agrawal and Singh (n 13) 96. 
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which the obligation to pay arose, were most densely grouped at Lyallpur and that that was 
its natural seat and the place with which the transaction had its closest and most real 
connection.”42 Furthermore, it should be noted that different systems of law can be selected 
by the parties for different parts of the contract.43  
        
2.3  The role of the Hague Principles in respect of choice of law in international commercial 
contracts in Indian private international law 
The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (Hague 
Principles)44 is ‘soft law’, that is, it is not binding on any country unless such country in actual 
fact adopts it into its’ laws. The purpose of the Hague Principles is to harmonise conflict of 
law rules and also to provide a model law for those countries that do not have a sufficient 
system of law on the issue. The Preamble of the Hague Principles states that same may be 
used as a model for national, regional, supranational or international instruments in respect 
of conflict of law issues regarding international commercial contracts. The Preamble 
furthermore states that the Hague Principles can be used to interpret, supplement and 
develop rules of private international law; and also that courts and arbitral tribunals may 
apply the principles contained in the model.45  
 
‘Article 2 – Freedom of Choice’.46 Article 2(1) of the Hague Principles provides that the 
governing law of the contract will be the law chosen by the parties. Article 2(2) provides that 
the parties may choose different laws to govern different parts of the contract. Article 2(4) 
provides that the parties can choose a neutral law, that is, a connection is not required 
between the law that the parties choose and the parties or their specific transaction. This is 
line with the subjective interpretation of the principle of party autonomy as discussed 
above.47 
                                                          
42 Indian Kanoon (n 26) 10. 
43 Agrawal and Singh (n 13) 95. 
44 Hague Principles (n 12). 
45 Neels (n 14) 443 and Khanderia (n 2) 5. 
46 Hague Principles (n 12). 
47 Khanderia (n 24). 
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‘Article 4 – Express and tacit choice’.48 Article 4 makes provision for both an express and tacit 
choice of law. For tacit choice of law, same must ‘appear clearly from the provisions of the 
contract or the circumstances’. The words ‘appear clearly’ indicates that the threshold for 
tacit choice of law is high. Furthermore, a choice of forum does not in itself equate to a choice 
of law. 
 
‘Article 11 – Overriding mandatory rules and public policy’.49 Article 11(1) states that a court 
will not be prevented from applying the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum, 
regardless of the law that was chosen by the parties. Article 11(3) enables a court to disregard 
the application of a provision of the chosen law where such application would be against the 
public policy of the forum. 
 
 
3. The European Union: The Rome I Regulation 
3.1 Background 
The Rome Convention50 was opened for signature by EU Member States in 1980 and came 
into force in 1991. The purpose of the Rome Convention was to establish a unified system of 
law to determine choice of law issues in respect of contracts in the EU.51 The Rome 
Convention was replaced by the ‘Rome I Regulation’,52 and is applicable to contracts 
concluded from 17 December 2009.53 Recital (6) of the Rome I Regulation emphasises the 
need for predictability in respect of the outcome of litigation, as well as certainty with regard 
to the applicable law, for the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market.54 An important 
difference between the Rome Convention and the Rome I Regulation is that in terms of the 
latter, the European Court has the final say in respect of issues of interpretation.55  
 
                                                          
48 Hague Principles (n 12). 
49 Hague Principles (n 12). 
50 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (80/934/EEC) (1980). 
51 Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (2012) 1779 par 32-009. 
52 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
53 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1781 par 32-011 and Rome I Regulation (n 1) Article 28. 
54 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
55 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1779 par 32-009.  
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3.2 The law applicable in international commercial contracts 
‘Article 1 – Material Scope’. Article 1(1) states that the Rome I Regulation applies where there 
is a conflict of laws in respect of contractual obligations in both civil and commercial 
matters.56  
 
Choice of law 
‘Article 3 – Freedom of choice’. Article 3(1) affords the parties to a contract the opportunity 
to choose the law that they would like to be applicable to their contract. This is known as an 
express choice.57 The Rome I Regulation has universal application in terms of Article 2, that 
is, the parties to the contract can choose any law; the choice is not restricted to the law of an 
EU Member State.58 This is referred to as ‘party autonomy’. The principle of party autonomy 
provides legal certainty to conflict of law issues. Recital 11 of the Rome I Regulation provides 
that the parties’ right to choose the applicable law should be a cornerstone in conflict of law 
rules in respect of contractual matters.59 Recital (12) provides that a choice of forum does not 
equate to a choice of the applicable law; instead, it should be one of the factors to take into 
account when determining the applicable law (in the absence of a choice of law by the 
parties). 
 
Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation also provides for an implied or tacit choice of law. For a 
court to determine a tacit choice of law, same will have to be ‘clearly demonstrated’ in terms 
of the terms and conditions of a contract, or by the particular circumstances of a matter.60 In 
other words, there must be evidence that contracting parties in actual fact had the intention 
to choose a particular law to be applicable to their contract.61 The words ‘clearly  
                                                          
56 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
57 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
58 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1778 par 32-023. 
59 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1798 par 32-042. 
60 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
61Ruhl “The law applicable to smart contracts, or much ado about nothing” 2019 3 
(https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/01/law-applicable-smart-contracts-much-ado-about-
nothing (10-08-2019)).  
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demonstrated’ indicates that the test / requirements for tacit choice of law is higher than that 
under the Rome Convention.62 Ruhl points out that due to the stringent requirements for tacit 
choice of law, it will usually be missing.63 The court is not allowed to infer a choice of law that 
the parties to the contract might have made where the parties had no clear intention of 
making a choice in respect of the applicable law.64 
 
Applicable law in the absence of choice 
‘Article 4 – Applicable law in the absence of choice’. This article deals with a scenario where 
the parties have not chosen the applicable law to the contract, that is, where there is neither 
an express, nor tacit choice of law in terms of Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation.  
Article 4(1)(a)-(h) of the Rome I Regulation65 contains eight hard-and-fast rules in respect of 
eight specific categories of contracts which come into effect if the parties have either not 
chosen a specific law to govern the contract or where tacit choice is not applicable (in terms 
of Article 3(1)), and also where Articles 5 to 8 of the Rome I Regulation is not applicable.66 In 
terms of Article 4(1)(a), contracts dealing with the sale of goods are to be governed by the 
law of the country of the seller’s habitual residence. In terms of Article 4(1)(b), contracts 
concerning the provision of services are to be governed by the law of the country of habitual 
residence of the relevant service provider. In terms of Article 4(1)(c), contracts concerning a 
right in rem in immovable property or tenancy in immovable property are to be governed by 
the laws of the relevant country where such immovable property is located. Article 4(1)(d) 
provides an exception to Article 4(1)(c), that is, where such tenancy is for temporary private 
use for a period of less than six consecutive months. In such an instance the tenancy  
 
 
                                                          
62 Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention set out a lower threshold for tacit choice of law, that is, a tacit choice of 
law had to be demonstrated with ‘reasonable certainty’ by either the terms and conditions of the contract, or 
by the circumstances of the case. 
63 Ruhl (n 61).  
64 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1809 par 32-059. 
65 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
66 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) and Article 4(1)(a)-(h) of the Rome I Regulation. 
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agreement will be subject to the laws of the country of habitual residence of the landlord if 
the tenant is a natural person who is also habitually resident in that country. In terms of Article 
4(1)(e), franchise contracts are subject to the laws of the country of habitual residence of the 
franchisee. In terms of Article 4(1)(f), distribution contracts are subject to the laws of the 
country of habitual residence of the distributor. In terms of Article 4(1)(g), contracts in respect 
of the sale of goods that occur via auction are subject to the laws of the country where the 
auction occurs, provided that the place can be ascertained. In terms of Article 4(1)(h), 
contracts that are concluded within a multilateral system that either brings together or 
facilitates the bringing together of multiple 3rd party selling and buying of interests in various 
financial instruments (as defined in point (17) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC) in 
accordance with non-discretionary rules and which is governed by a single law, will be 
governed by such single law. It should be noted that Article 4(1)(a)-(f) prescribes that the 
applicable law is generally the law of the place of habitual residence of one of the parties. It 
must be furthermore noted that this theme is not concerned with the place of characteristic 
performance; instead, it is concerned with either the habitual residence, place of central 
administration, principal place of business or relevant branch of a business (whichever is 
applicable) of the party that is required to effect characteristic performance under the 
contract.67      
 
Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation68 provides that where the contract in question is not 
catered for in terms of Article 4(1)(a)-(h), or where the relevant contract falls within more 
than one of the eight categories provided for Article 4(1)(a)-(h), such contract is subject to the 
law of the country of the habitual residence of the party that is responsible for the 
characteristic performance under the contract. Again, this concept is not concerned with the 
place of characteristic performance; instead, it is concerned with either the habitual 
residence, place of central administration, principal place of business or relevant branch of a 
business (whichever is applicable) of the party that is required to effect characteristic  
                                                          
67 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1822 par 32-075. 
68 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
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performance under the contract.69 Note, that in order for Article 4(2) to be of application, 
there must be no express or tacit choice of law that is applicable in terms of Article 3(1) of the 
Rome I Regulation. 
 
Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation70 operates as an ‘escape clause’, that is, where Article 
4(1) or (2) is applicable to the specific scenario, but it is clear from all of the circumstances of 
a particular matter that the contract in question is manifestly more closely connected with a 
different country (in other words, a country that is different to the country indicated in terms 
of Article 4(1) or (2)), then the law of the other country will be applicable to the contract.71 
Recital (20) of the Rome I Regulation provides that one should take into account, amongst 
other things, whether or not the relevant contract has a very close relationship with another 
contract/s in order to determine ‘the other country’.72 The Rome Convention, that is, the 
predecessor to the Rome I Regulation, also contained an ‘escape clause’ in terms of Article 
4(5).73 However, the Rome Convention contained presumptions in respect of the applicable 
law in certain instances. Whereas the Rome I Regulation contains eight hard-and-fast rules in 
respect of the applicable law for specific types of contracts.74 The leading case on the 
operation and interpretation of the escape clause under the Rome Convention is the 
Intercontainer Interfrigo75 case. In casu, Belgian law was chosen as the applicable law in terms 
of a draft contract; the draft contract was however never signed.76 The court said that the 
Rome Convention recognised that there was a need for certain flexibility with regard to the 
determination of the law that was in actual fact most closely connected to the relevant 
contract.77 Thus, notwithstanding the presumptions under the Rome Convention, the main 
objective was to apply the law of the country that the contract was most closely connected  
                                                          
69 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1822 par 32-075. 
70 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
71 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1824 par 32-078. 
72 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
73 Rome Convention (n 50). 
74 See the discussion on Article 4(1)(a)-(h) of the Rome I Regulation above. 
75 Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen BV, MIC Operations BV C-133/08 (2009) E.C.R I-
9687. 
76 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1824 par 32-079. 
77 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1825 par 32-079. 
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to.78 Furthermore, any relevant factors could be taken into account for the purpose of this 
determination by the courts.79 The escape clause may most likely be relied upon in the event 
that the place of performance is different to the place of business or habitual residence (as 
the case may be) of the party: (i) identified in Article 4(1)(a)-(h); or (ii) who is required to effect 
the characteristic performance under the relevant contract in relation to Article 4(2).80  
 
Article 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation operates as a ‘residual clause’, that is, where neither 
Article 4(1) or (2) provides a determination of the law applicable to the contract, then the 
contract will be subject to the law of the country with which it has ‘its most closest 
connection’. Recital (21) of the Rome I Regulation provides that one should take into account, 
amongst other things, whether or not the relevant contract has a very close relationship with 
another contract/s in order to determine ‘the other country’.81  
Ruhl summarises Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation as follows:  
“If the parties have not chosen the applicable law, Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation comes 
into play. It subjects contracts to the law of the closest connection and determines the 
applicable law with help of a complex combination of specific choice of law rules, residual 
choice of law rules, and escape clauses. In most cases this combination will lead to the 
application of the law of habitual residence of the party required to effect the characteristic 
performance.”82 
 
Dicey, Morris and Collins explain the concept of ‘characteristic performance’ as follows: 
“The objective of the doctrine of characteristic performance is to isolate the obligation 
incumbent on one of the parties which is peculiar to the type of contract in issue, or which 
marks the nature of the contract and thereby link the contract to social and economic 
environment of which it will form a part. This process involves the much criticised conclusion 
that in bilateral contracts the payment of money is not the performance which is characteristic 
of the contract, but it is the performance for which the payment is due which usually constitutes 
‘the centre of gravity and the socio-economic function of the contractual transaction’”.83    
                                                          
78 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1825 par 32-079. 
79 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1826 par 32-080. 
80 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1826 par 32-080. 
81 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
82 Ruhl (n 61) 2-3. 
83 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1823 par 32-007. 
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In general, the Rome I Regulation’s general objective is to provide legal certainty within the 
EU, by formulating rules in terms whereof the outcome is highly predictable; but which also 
provide a degree of flexibility in that the courts have a certain level of discretion to determine 
which system of law is most closely connected to the relevant situation.84 
 
Articles 5 to 885 of the Rome I Regulation – Protection of weaker parties – Special types of 
contracts. These Articles dictate which law is applicable to these special types of contracts; 
they are intended to protect the weaker parties to a contract.86 These articles will be 
discussed below. 
 
‘Article 5 – Contracts of carriage’. Article 5(1) prescribes, in relation to a contract of carriage 
of goods, that where the parties have not chosen the applicable law in terms Article 3(1), the 
applicable law to the contract will be the law of the country of the carrier’s habitual residence, 
provided that one of the following requirements are also met: the place of delivery of the 
goods, the place of receipt of the goods or the consignor’s habitual residence must be the 
same as the habitual residence of the carrier. In the event that these requirements have not 
been met, then the law of the place of delivery of the goods as agreed by the parties will 
apply. Article 5(2) prescribes, in relation to a contract for the carriage of passengers, that 
where the parties have not chosen the applicable law in accordance with the options provided 
in Article 5(2)(a)-(e), then the applicable law is the law of the country of the passenger’s 
habitual residence, provided that one of the following requirements are also met: either the 
place of departure or the place of destination is situated in the same country. In the event 
that these requirements have not been met, then the law of the carrier’s habitual residence 
will apply to the contract. Article 5(2), paragraph (a)-(e), allows the parties to choose the 
applicable law to a contract of carriage of passengers in terms of Article 3(1), but limits the 
choice to the law of the country of either: (a) the passenger’s habitual residence; (b) the  
                                                          
84 Recital (16) of the Rome I Regulation and Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1820 par 32-071. 
85 Rome I Regulation (n 1) ‘Article 5 – Contracts of carriage’; ‘Article 6 – Consumer contracts’; ‘Article 7 – 
Insurance contracts’; ‘Article 8 – Individual employment contracts’. 
86 Rome I Regulation (n 1) Recital (23). 
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carrier’s habitual residence; (c) the carrier’s place of central administration; (d) the place of 
departure; or (e) the place of destination. 
Article 5(3) of the Rome I Regulation operates as an ‘escape clause’ and provides that, “Where 
it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract, in the absence of choice of 
law, is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in 
paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country will apply.”   
 
‘Article 6 – Consumer contracts’. Article 6(1) deals with a contract concluded by a natural 
person (that is, ‘the consumer’) outside of such natural person’s profession or trade, with 
another person (that is, ‘the professional’) who acts within his profession or trade and dictates 
that such contract shall be subject to the law of the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer with the proviso that the professional either: (a) operates his professional or 
commercial activities in the same country as the habitual residence of the consumer; or (b) 
directs his professional or commercial activities to the same country. Furthermore, the 
contract must fall within the scope of such activities. Article 6(2) provides that the parties may 
choose the law applicable to their contracts, notwithstanding paragraph 1, provided that the 
exercise of such choice will not result in the consumer being deprived of the protection that 
was afforded to him by the applicable law, where such protection cannot be derogated from 
in terms of an agreement between the parties. Article 6(3) provides that where the 
requirements contained in Article 6(1) under point (a) or (b) cannot be met, then Articles 3 
and 4 of the Rome I Regulation will apply to the contract concluded between a professional 
and consumer.87 Article 6(4)(a)-(e) provides for exceptions to the applicability of Article 6(1) 
and (2). 
 
‘Article 7 – Insurance contracts’. Article 7(1) provides that this Article is not applicable to 
reinsurance contracts. Article 7(2) dictates that an insurance contract that provides cover for 
a large risk (as per definition in Article 5(d) of the First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July  
                                                          
87 Refer to the relevant sections above for a discussion on Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome I Regulation. 
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1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life insurance), will be 
governed by the chosen law of the parties in terms of Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation.88 
For the purpose of Article 7(2), it is irrelevant whether or not the risk covered is located within 
an EU Member State. Where the parties have not chosen the applicable law, then the 
applicable law to the insurance contract will be the law of the country of the insurer’s habitual 
residence. However, should it be clear from all the circumstances of the case that the 
insurance contract is manifestly more closely connected to a different country, then the 
applicable law will be the law of that other country.89 Article 7(3) applies to insurance 
contracts that are not covered in terms of Article 7(2); furthermore, it is not applicable to 
reinsurance contracts. Article 7(3) permits the parties to an insurance contract to choose the 
applicable law in terms of Article 3(1), however, only the following laws may be chosen in 
terms of Article 7(3)(a)-(e):  
“(a) the law of any Member State where the risk is situated at the time of conclusion of the 
contract; (b) the law of the country where the policy holder has his habitual residence; (c) in the 
case of life insurance, the law of the Member State of which the policy holder is a national; (d) for 
insurance contracts covering risks limited to events occurring in one Member State other than the 
Member State where the risk is situated, the law of that Member State; (e) where the policy holder 
of a contract falling under this paragraph pursues a commercial or industrial activity or a liberal 
profession and the insurance contract covers two or more risks which relate to those activities and 
are situated in different Member States, the law of any of the Member States concerned or the 
law of the country of habitual residence of the policy holder.”90  
 
‘Article 8 – Individual employment contracts’. Article 8(1) allows the parties to choose the law 
applicable to an individual employment contract, provided that the law chosen will not have 
the effect of depriving the relevant employee from any protection that he would have 
received under the applicable law that would have been (in terms of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of  
 
                                                          
88 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
89 Rome I Regulation (n 1) Article 7(2). 
90 Rome I Regulation (n 1) Article 7(3)(a)-(e). 
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Article 8), had the parties not chosen a different law to apply. Article 8(2) provides that where 
the parties’ did not exercise their right to choose the applicable law, such contract will be 
subject to the law of the country either in which, (or failing this), from which, the relevant 
employee habitually performs his duties under the said contract. In the event that the 
employee is employed in a different country on a temporary basis, then the original country 
where the work is habitually performed will not change as a result of the temporary 
employment in a different country. Article 8(3) provides that in the event that it is not possible 
to ascertain the applicable law in terms of Article 8(2), then the relevant contract will be 
subject to the laws of the country where the actual business place is situated, that is, the 
business place where the said employee was engaged. Article 8(4) makes provision for the 
law of a different country to apply to the contract where the circumstances considered as a 
whole is more closely connected to the relevant contract, that is, in instances where this is a 
different country to that indicated in Article 8(2) or (3).91 
 
‘Article 9 – Overriding mandatory provisions’. Article 9(2) makes provision for the application 
of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum, irrespective of the law applicable to the 
contract in question.92  
 
‘Article 21 – Public policy of the forum’. Where any provisions of the applicable law is against 
the public policy of the forum, then the application of same may be refused by the forum.93 
 
3.3  The development of choice of law in international commercial contracts in the United 
 Kingdom’s private international law 
Although the UK joined the EU on 1 January 1973, the UK followed the common law system 
in relation to the applicable law in respect of international commercial contracts until the  
 
 
                                                          
91 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
92 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
93 Rome I Regulation (n 1). 
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enactment of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 (“the UK Act”). The UK Act had the 
effect of abandoning the common law system for conflicts of law matters, and replacing it 
with the application of the Rome Convention in the UK.94 The UK Act became effective on 1 
April 1991 and (still) applies to international commercial contracts concluded prior to 17 
December 2009.95 The Rome I Regulation replaced the Rome Convention and applies to 
contracts concluded after 17 December 2009. The UK Act was thus amended in 2009 to make 
provision for the application of the Rome I Regulation in the UK (where relevant).96 
 
The British colonised India until 1974 when India gained its independence. India thus inherited 
the English common law system. The rules and principles relating to conflict of law issues in 
India are still based on the (old) English common law system; however, the courts in India are 
not obliged to follow same as India is no longer under colonisation. The rationale for India still 
relying on the (old) English common law system is as a result of India not having a statute to 
regulate conflict of law issues.97 As can be seen above, the UK follows the Rome I Regulation, 
but India has to date not progressed in this regard. 
 
4. Comparison 
Neels and Khanderia argue that India could make use of the Hague Principles in order to 
enhance its private international law rules in respect of the issue of choice of law.98  
Neels and Khanderia submit that the Indian courts can rely on Article 2(4) of the Hague 
Principles which provides that the parties can choose a neutral law to be the proper law of 
the contract, that is, no connection is required between the parties or their particular 
transaction and the law chosen by the parties to govern the contract.99 There are currently 
conflicting decisions by the Supreme Court of India on this issue. In terms of both the Delhi  
 
                                                          
94 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1775. 
95 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1775. 
96 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 51) 1775. 
97 Agrawal and Singh (n 13) 93. 
98 Neels (n 14) 445 and Khanderia (n 2) 5. 
99 Neels (n 14) 445 and Khanderia (n 2) 5. 
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Cloth and General Mills case100 (1955) and the British India and Steam Navigation Co. Ltd 
case101 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the parties have the right to choose the proper 
law of the contract, but that such right is limited to a choice of law that is connected to the 
parties and the relevant transaction. In other words, the Supreme Court applied the objective 
interpretation to the principle of party autonomy. The National Thermal Power Corporation 
case102 (1993) is currently the leading authority on the issue. In casu, the Supreme Court 
favoured the subjective interpretation of the principle of party autonomy.103 In addition to 
Neels and Khanderia’s respective submissions that the Indian Courts could rely on Article 2(4) 
of the Hague Principles on the issue, it is hereby submitted that the Indian legislature could 
rely on Article 2(4) to further develop the rules of conflict of laws in India. There is nothing to 
prevent the Supreme Court from once again changing its mind in respect of this issue (thus 
creating further uncertainty and unpredictability). The Hague Principles can be used as a 
model in this regard. The current position on party autonomy in India is generally in line with 
international best practice,104 but certainty and predictability are still lacking in the Indian 
legal system. The Indian legal system only has flexibility; this is not good enough for 
international trade purposes. The best option is for India to codify its stance on private 
international law, more specifically conflict of law issues. Predictability and certainty is 
required in respect of both choice of law, as well as what the proper law of the contract will 
be in the event that the parties have not chosen a system of law to govern their contract. The 
Rome I Regulation is well balanced in the sense that it provides certainty and predictability, 
as well as a certain degree of flexibility in terms of the escape clause contained in Article 4(3). 
Note that the Rome I Regulation also provides for the parties to choose a neutral system of 
law in terms of Article 2, read together with Article 3(1). The Indian legal system on the issue 
is based on the (old) English common law. However, the UK itself no longer applies these rules 
and principles.  
 
                                                          
100 See n 26 and 27 above. 
101 See n 29 and 31 above. 
102 See n 32 above. 
103 Refer to ‘s 2.2 – Choice of law’ of this mini-dissertation for the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application 
of Dicey’s Rule 180, Sub-rule (1), in casu. 
104 Khanderia (n 12) 1. 
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Instead, the UK has moved on and has ‘opted in’, thus, the UK is now subject to the Rome I 
Regulation.105 
 
Whilst the current position in India on party autonomy is as laid out in the leading case of 
National Thermal Power Corporation106 that is, that the parties are allowed to choose a 
neutral legal system to govern their contracts, subject only to same being legal and bona fide. 
However, it is unclear what the concept of bona fide entails in this context. Khanderia submits 
that a choice of law will meet the requirements of being legal and bona fide if same does not 
flout the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum and public policy.107 This is in line with 
Article 11(1) of the Hague Principles which dictates that a court will not be prevented from 
applying the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum, regardless of the law that was 
chosen by the parties; and also Article 11(3) which enables a court to disregard the application 
of a provision of the chosen law where such application would be against the public policy of 
the forum. It is also in line with Article 9(2) of the Rome I Regulation which makes provision 
for the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum, irrespective of the 
law applicable to the contract in question; and also Article 21 which provides that where any 
provisions of the applicable law is against the public policy of the forum, then the application 
of same may be refused by the forum.  
 
Neels notes that prior to the National Thermal Power Corporation case, at least two Supreme 
Court decisions can be relied upon for the view that a choice of forum or arbitral tribunal 
could be indicative of a tacit choice of law by the parties.108 Agrawal and Singh have noted a 
similar observation.109 In the National Thermal Power Corporation case, the Supreme Court  
 
                                                          
105 Refer to s 3.3 of this mini-dissertation for a discussion on the development of conflict of law rules in the UK. 
106 See n 32 above. 
107 Khanderia (n 2) 9-10. 
108 Neels (n 14) 446. 
109 Agrawal and Singh (n 13) 96. 
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however held that a choice of forum is not sufficient to equate to a tacit choice of law in 
isolation.110 Once again, this can cause uncertainty and can lead to unpredictability. India can 
solve this problem by codifying its conflict of law rules and can rely on Article 4 of the Hague 
Principles which specifically states that a choice of forum by itself is not sufficient to equate 
to a choice of law. Recital (12) of the Rome I Regulation provides that a choice of forum does 
not equate to a choice of the applicable law; instead, it should be one of the factors to take 
into account when determining the applicable law (in the absence of a choice of law by the 
parties). 
 
Article 1(1) of the Hague Principles states that same is not applicable to ‘consumer contracts’ 
and ‘employment contracts’. There is no further detail in the Hague Principles as to how to 
deal with consumer contracts and employment contracts. Whereas Articles 5 – 8 of the Rome 
I Regulation deal with specific types of contracts, including consumer contracts and 
employment contracts. The purpose of these Articles is for the protection of the weaker 
parties to these contracts.111 India will thus not be able to rely on the Hague Principles in 
respect of choice of law issues with regard to specific types of contracts in terms whereof 
weaker parties should be protected by the law. However, should India decide to codify its 
conflict of law rules, there is nothing that prevents India from looking at the Rome I Regulation 
(or any other system of law) for guidance in this regard even though the Rome I Regulation 
was not drafted with the purpose of being used as a model law. 
 
Article 4(1)(a)-(h) of the Rome I Regulation contains eight hard-and-fast rules in relation to 
what law will be applicable for those eight categories contracts. It is important to note that 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation is only applicable where the parties have not selected the 
applicable law. The Hague Principles does not deal with the applicable law in the absence of  
 
                                                          
110 Neels (n 14) 446. 
111 Refer to s 3.2 of this mini-dissertation for a view of how Articles 5-8 of the Rome I Regulation protect 
weaker parties in relation to these specific types of contracts. 
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choice of law being exercised by the parties. Thus, the Hague Principles do not contain a 
similar provision to Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. Article 4(1)(a)-(f) of the Rome I 
Regulation prescribes that the applicable law is generally the law of the place of habitual 
residence, place of central administration, principal place of business or relevant branch of a 
business (whichever is applicable)  of one of the parties, that is, the party that is required to 
effect the characteristic performance under the contract. Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation 
operates as an ‘escape clause’, that is, where Article 4(1) or (2) is applicable to the specific 
scenario, but it is clear from all of the circumstances of a particular matter that the contract 
in question is manifestly more closely connected with a different country (in other words, a 
country that is different to the country indicated in terms of Article 4(1) or (2)), then the law 
of the other country will be applicable to the contract. Article 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation 
operates as a ‘residual clause’, that is, where neither Article 4(1) or (2) provides a 
determination of the law applicable to the contract, then the contract will be subject to the 
law of the country with which it has ‘its most closest connection’. It is clear from Articles 3(1) 
and 4 of the Rome I Regulation that same provides certainty, predictability and flexibility. 
India’s conflict of law rules do not contain any hard-and-fast rules, nor presumptions that can 
operate in isolation. The basic test in the absence of choice of law by the parties is the ‘closest 
and most real connection’ test.112 This is similar to the test as set out in Article 4(3) and (4) of 
the Rome I Regulation. However, the courts in India can apply this test differently; this can 
once again lead to uncertainty and unpredictability. Again, should India decide to codify its 
conflict of law rules, there is nothing that prevents India from looking at the Rome I Regulation 
(or any other system of law) for guidance in this regard even though the Rome I Regulation 
was not drafted with the purpose of being used as a model law. As demonstrated above, the 
Hague Principles cannot assist in respect of the applicable law in the absence of a choice by 
the parties. 
 
 
                                                          
112 Refer to n 35 above for a discussion on this by the Supreme Court of India in the National Thermal Power 
Corporation case. 
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5. Conclusion 
As can be seen from the above, Indian private international law in respect of conflict of law 
issues is generally in line with international standards, however, there remains uncertainty 
and unpredictability. Where the Supreme Court of India has clarified some of these issues in 
recent cases, it must be noted that there remains the risk of courts coming to different 
decisions in subsequent cases. It is hereby submitted that the Indian legislature should 
consider developing and refining the conflict of law rules in India by codifying same. This will 
result in greater certainty and predictability. A certain degree of flexibility can also be 
introduced into such codification if the Rome I Regulation is relied upon for guidance in this 
regard. Furthermore, the Hague Principles can be used as a model as same is also in line with 
international best practice insofar as express and tacit choice of law are concerned. The 
applicable law / proper law of the contract in the absence of the parties choosing a law to 
govern their contract is not dealt with in the Hague Principles. However, as pointed out above, 
should India decide to codify its conflict of law rules in relation to international commercial 
contracts, there is nothing that prevents India from looking at the Rome I Regulation (or any 
other appropriate system of law) for guidance in this regard, even though the Rome I 
Regulation was not drafted with the purpose of being used as a model law. 
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